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ARGUMENT
ISSUE NO. I
Appellee's Version of the Facts on Appeal Reconstructs
a Scenario Rejected by the Only Trier of Fact And, on Appeal
from Summary Judgment, is Contrary to Utah Law.
In reviewing the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Appellant is first impressed that
the function of a reply brief shall be limited to answering "any new matter set forth in the
opposing brief. Rule 24(c) Utah R. App. P. In reviewing the brief of Appellee, Appellant
is struck with the clear concept that the case appealed from, as recited by Appellee, is wholly
different from that statement of facts set forth by Appellant. Appellee's factual statement
propounds that on the day following her son's suicide, being advised of the existence of
decedent's contemporaneous writings directed to Appellee, Appellee made no inquiry
regarding their contents for over five days. Appellee cannot explain why, with no knowledge
of the cremation note's contents, she, nonetheless, immediately consulted a mortician
specifically about avoiding cremation within one day of her son's death. Appellee also
immediately prohibited her family from discussing the cremation note' s contents or revealing
the note to Appellant. Appellee goes to great lengths blaming Appellant for the apparent
estrangement between Appellee and the decedent. Certainly, Appellee has no responsibility
in this regard. Appellee then states that only following decedent's funeral in New Mexico
did she first review his written notes, and then rushed over to Appellant to reveal the
cremation note's full contents. Appellee then asserts, that with full knowledge of the note's
contents, Appellant consented to the burial of her husband in St. George, Utah. Thereafter,

in defending her continuing inequitable behavior during the proceedings below, Appellee
argues that Appellant somehow mistakenly failed to appear at a "hearing" to be held on April
15, 2003 and that those rules of civil procedure, together with the rules of judicial
administration, applicable to motions and orders are apparently advisory in nature and do not
mandate compliance regardless of their clear language.
Not wanting to be laborious in reply, Appellant is constrained, nonetheless, to reiterate
that point set forth as Issue IV in her original brief. Simply stated, on review of a summary
judgment, the party against whom the judgment has been granted is entitled to have all the
facts presented and all the inferences fairly arising therefrom considered in a light most
favorable to her. See, e.g., Winegar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104 (Utah 1991); English v.
Kienke, 774 P.2d 1154 (Utah Ct. App 1989). In the instant case, the only Judge to have
heard the testimony of Appellee, recited on appeal by Appellee to support her position,
discounted Appellee's credibility. Clearly, Judge Shumate, having heard both the testimony
of Appellant and Appellee concluded that only after the decedent's burial in St. George did
Appellant become aware of her husband's written directive to be cremated. (R397). This
comports with the Appellant's statement of facts which are the only facts which the Court
of Appeals can legitimately consider. IHC Health Servs. Inc. v. D & K Mgmt, Inc. ,73 P.3d
320, 323 (Utah 2003). As a result, Appellant must assert that Appellee's facts are a
euphemistic reconstruction of a scenario wholly rejected by the only trier of fact in the instant
case. Indeed, Appellee's version of the facts should be wholly crossed out or simply respelled as FAXX.
7.

Judge Beacham, subsequently assigned to the case, concluded that under any
circumstances the mere burial of the decedent comprised a waiver on Appellant's part of her
primary right to dispose of her husband's body. This resolution, however, does not take into
account the fact that the burial occurred under circumstances wherein Appellee willfully
concealed the decedent's written request from Appellant despite the latter's inquiry. This
statement of fact was clearly before Judge Beacham. Oxymoronically, however, Judge
Beacham clearly states in his summary judgment that in finding for Appellee he accepted
Appellee's version of facts set forth in Appellee's supporting memorandum. (R862). This,
again, is directly inapposite to Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Appellant's version of the facts, for purposes of the summary judgment, can be found
at R810-13, R822-24, and R852-56. At the District Court, Appellant stated that though the
decedent had phoned her on February 12, 2002 orally expressing a desire to be cremated,
decedent had also phoned her back one-half hour later stating that he did not mean what he
had said. Appellant also asserted that Appellee, anxious that Appellant would feel bound by
the note and cremate her husband, allowed Appellant only to see a portion of the note with
Appellant not seeing the entire note until the summer of 2002. (R811). Appellant thereafter
clearly sets forth that by previously attending the funeral service in Utah she did not affirm
decedent's burial because she was not aware of Curtis' wish to be cremated at this point and
would not have allowed the burial had she known of her deceased husband's directive.
(R812, 824). Appellant's Memorandum in Opposition to Appellee's Motion for Summary
Judgment is attached as Exhibit " 1 " of the Reply Brief Addendum, the first four pages of

which comprise a portion of Appellant's factual statements. Exhibit "2" of the Reply Brief
Addendum shall comprise that factual Affidavit of Leslie Dozzo-Hughes, timely filed on
August 4, 2003, contemporaneous with her Memorandum in opposition to Summary
Judgment. Furthermore, Appellant's final Reply Brief in the lower court is attached hereto
as Exhibit "3" to the Reply Brief Addendum.
In conclusion, Appellant asserts that the factual scenario relied on by Appellee to seek
affirmation of the lower Court's judgment should be wholly rejected as a matter of law by
the Court of Appeals. Similarly, Judge Beacham's acceptance of Appellee's version of facts
in finding in Appellee's favor is contrary to Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
ISSUE NO, II
Appellee's Reconstruction of the Events of April 15, 2003
is Both ill-conceived and Tenwous.
In Appellee's first issue before the Court, Appellee blames Appellant as contributing
to Appellee and her counsel's confusion surrounding the proceedings of April 15, 2003.
Appellee indicates Appellant provided no explanation as to why Appellant "thought the April
15, 2003 hearing was cancelled". (Appellee's Brief at 17). Appellant's explanation,
however, is implicit within the context of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Appellee's
Motion to Recuse, filed at 4:55 p.m. on April 14, 2003 ostensibly cancelled the April 15,
2003 hearing. Rule 63(b)(2) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure clearly states that "[t]he judge
against whom the motion and affidavit are directed shall, without further hearing, enter an
order granting the motion or certifying the motion and affidavit to a reviewing judge ." Id
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(emphasis added).
The transcript of the April 15,2003 hearing clearly states that Appellee arrived alone
with her counsel. Appellee's counsel then advised the Judge of Appellee's Motion to
Recuse. Thereafter, seeking to take advantage of Appellant's counsel's understanding that
procedurally no hearing could occur, Appellee withdrew her Motion to Recuse and
proceeded with an orally propounded Motion to Dismiss. Appellee then attempts to
distinguish her actions from those undertaken in Stebbins v. White, 235 Cal. Rptr. 656, (Cal.
Ct. App. 1987) by concluding that by withdrawing her Motion to Recuse, she did not
"repudiate her recusal motion". (Appellee's Brief at 18). Indeed, Appellee's tenuous logic
would suggest that withdrawal of a motion by a party is not akin to repudiation of that
motion. Appellee's five lines in reply attempting to distinguish Stebbins are succinctly set
forth as follows:
Stebbins is dramatically different than the case at hand. First, Petitioner has
never tried to repudiate her recusal request. The request was withdrawn and
after the confused hearing of April 15,2003, Petitioner filed as an order what
was thought to represent the intent of the ruling of the court. Petitioner clearly
has never attempted to repudiate her recusal motion.

Clearly, the Court of Appeals should not entertain Appellee's casuistic semantics in
contrasting "withdraw" and "repudiate." This course ultimately provides more misdirection
and confusion than clarity in the law. See, e.g., Cobabe v. Crawford, 780 P.2d 834, 836-37
(Utah Ct. App. 1989) (discussing the synonymous meaning of the words "prevailing" and
"successful" in reversing a lower court). Appellee's withdrawal of her motion to recuse is

not only akin to repudiating it, but withdrawal is exactly the same procedure that occurred
in Stebbins.
Within minutes after the hearing on April 15, 2003, it cannot be gainsaid that
Appellant's counsel discussed the hearing with Appellee's counsel and specifically requested
that a copy of the proposed Order of Dismissal be submitted for counsel's review. (Rl 90-92;
140-44). Appellee and her counsel, directly contrary to the then applicable Utah Rules of
Administrative Procedure, submitted an order which Judge Shumate properly found was
erroneous. (R3 99). This erroneous order was intentionally propounded in memorialized form
to Judge Shumate absent its prior submission to Appellant's counsel.
Appellee, without recitation of her and her counsel's inequitable behavior, then
recites, "Judge Shumate properly exercised judicial discretion when he ruled that orders
granting permanent injunction were invalid and recused himself from the proceedings".
(Appellant's Brief at 19). The difficulty with this statement, however, is that there were not
plural orders granting permanent injunction, only that single erroneous order willfully
prepared by Appellee and her counsel contrary to the proceedings they engaged in on April
15,2003. Furthermore, when Judge Shumate granted Appellee's Motion to Recuse in May
of 2003, that Motion had already been withdrawn one month earlier and less than one day
after it had been filed. (Rl 15; Tl 197 at 3-4). Judge Shumate ultimately should have entered
an order conforming to the dismissal so earnestly sought b> Appellee on April 15,2003. As
earlier set forth, Judge Shumate had retained authority to enter this order. (See Issue I,
Appellant's Brief). Ultimately, relieffromone's own counsel's legal negligence shouldnever
6

be obtained by sua sponte judicial intervention. Indeed, Utah Courts have consistently held
that relief "will not be granted based on the incompetence or negligence of one's own trial
counsel". Jennings v. Stoker, 652 P.2d 912, 913 (Utah 1982). Ultimately, as this Court has
clearly determined, "in the civil context, a malpractice action, not a new trial, is frequently
suggested as the appropriate remedy for the client whose counsel's performance falls below
the standard of professional competence". Davis v. Grand County Serv. Area, 905 P.2d 888,
894 (Utah Ct App. 1995).
Appellant further asserts that, beyond those actions undertaken by Appellee and her
counsel at the April 15, 2003 hearing, Appellee's submission of an erroneous order absent
prior review requested by Appellant was not mere incompetence, but was a willful act
undertaken as a purposeful manipulation of the courts of Utah. Judge Shumate clearly noted
that Appellee's new counsel's appearance on April 11, 2003 resulted in the case being
handled in a clumsy manner with "a general failure to comply with the rules of civil
procedure and the rules ofjudicial administration". (R398-99). Thereafter, Judge Shumate
clearly notes that having failed to comply with the rule, Appellee and her counsel further
propounded an order for the trial court's signature which was erroneous as a matter of law.
Appellant has clearly set forth in her initial brief that Judge Shumate's ruling indicating that
he had been divested of all jurisdiction by Appellee's mere filing of the motion to recuse on
April 14, 2003, is incorrect as a matter of law. Judge Shumate states clearly at R399 that
Petitioner [Appellee] withdrew the Rule 63 motion. Thereafter, the trial court retained
jurisdiction to make rulings in the instant case which are not void per se and which compel
7

dismissal of Appellee's case.
ISSUE NO. Ill
Appellee's Inequitable Actions in this Matter Preclude
her from Obtaining Equitable Relief.
Appellee concedes in her brief that if she were guilty of bad acts she would be barred
from relief. (Appellee's Brief at 25.) Nevertheless, Appellee appears blind to the obvious
truth that her actions in this matter concerning her son's wishes to be cremated and her
deliberate withholding of this information from Appellant were far short of equitable.
Appellee contends that choosing to bury her son does not automatically define Appellee as
having unclean hands. Appellee, however, defied clear directives in the suicide note from
her son regarding the disposition of his remains by cremation and decided that her personal
disdain for cremation and the location her son selected for the spreading of the ashes was
paramount to her son's preference.
Appellee's actions in this respect flies in the face of common respect for the wishes
of a decedent, who must rely on the integrity of those to whom directives are issued, as well
as the law, which generally provides that the wishes of a decedent regarding the disposition
of his remains should be followed. See In re the Estate of Mover. 577 P.2d 108,110 (Utah
1978); Cordts v. Cordts. 118 P.2d 556, 558 (Kan. 1941); Tkaczvk v. Gallagher. 222 A.2d
226, 228 (Conn. 1965); Guerin v. Cassidv. 119 A.2d 780, 782 (NJ. 1955). The Supreme
Court of this State clearly set forth that a person should be able to choose the manner in
which his body is disposed and the choice should be held to be binding after death as long
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as it is done within the limits of reason and decency related to the accepted customs of
mankind. In re Estate of Mover, 577 P.2d at 110. In this case, Appellee denied the request
of Appellant's husband for cremation, which is a disposition that is clearly reasonable and
decent according to custom. Mr. Hughes unfortunately misplaced his testamentary directives
with an individual who considered her own desires higher than those of her deceased son.
Appellee herself has admitted that she did not consider the wishes of Appellant's husband
regarding the disposition of body significant and that she did not think once about following
his directions regarding the disposition of his remains. (T1200 at 58, 60:24-61:2; Tl 195 at
26:1-2; 40:4-6). While Appellee's decision to bury her son's remains, contrary to clear
instructions otherwise, may be justified in her own mind, her behavior in this respect was
reproachful and certainly out of joint with principles of equity.
Appellee further carried through with her plan to bury the remains of Appellant's
husband contrary to his wishes by keeping the suicide note and its contents concealed from
Appellant. Appellee argues sternly that she was under no obligations to show the suicide
note to Appellant. (Appellee's Brief at 26.) However, under the common law and the law
as now codified in Utah, Appellant would have had the first exclusive right and duty to
determine the manner in which her husband's remains were disposed. See Utah Code Ann.
§58-9-602 (2002); Hackett v. Hackett 26 A. 42, 43-44 (R.I. 1893); Pettigrew v. Pettigrew.
56 A. 878 (Pa. 1904); Novelli v. Carroll 420 A.2d 469, 472 (Pa. Super. 1980). In fact,
Appellee herself admits that "In the case at hand, Respondent [Appellant] had a right as
Curtis's spouse to determine the disposition of his body." (Appellee's Brief at 29). As the
9

decedent's wife, Appellant had not only a right based on the marital relationship to know of
her husband's wishes concerning the disposition of his remains, but had a legal right to make
a determination in that regard, which determination was taken away by Appellee's refusal
to inform Appellant of the true desires of Appellant's husband.
Appellee would have this Court believe that she did not know the note's contents until
after the funeral service in New Mexico. (Appellee's Brief at 26.) This representation of
events, however, contrasts with the established facts that even before the New Mexico
funeral, Appellee had discussed avoiding cremation with a mortician and had prohibited
family from discussing the content's of the note with Appellant. Moreover, Appellee
specifically informed Appellant that the note did not contain a cremation request and that the
only content of the note concerning Appellant was a declaration of love. (T1200 at 48-51,
53, 55, 57, 58.) It is simply illogical to assume, and contrary the facts of the case, that
Appellee did not read the suicide note until March 6,2002 when she had obtained possession
of the note as early as February 28, 2002.
Moreover, after the New Mexico funeral, Appellee allowed Appellant only to see a
portion of the note with Appellant not seeing the contents of the entire document. (R811).
Appellant did see the full letter or learn of its full contents until late in the summer of 2002
during the course of proceedings related to her husband's insurance policy. (T1200 at 62:1823; 67:14-24). Appellee's claim that she showed Appellant the note and all its contents after
the New Mexico funeral is untrue and contrary to the findings of the only trier of fact to have
heard both parties' testimony. After hearing the testimony of both Appellant and Appellee
10

during the course of the two day trial in this matter, Judge Shumate, the only Judge to have
actually heard testimony of the parties, found that Appellant became aware of her husband's
desire to be cremated only after the burial in St. George, Utah. (R397). Had Appellant
known of the note's instructions prior to burial, Appellant would have had the remains of her
husband cremated before the burial was effectuated. (T1200 at 114:3-15). Appellant,
however, was deprived of this information due to Appellee's surreptitious behavior.
In regards to the procedural inequities, Appellee acknowledges that her former
counsel had played "legal hardball" but attempts to draw attention from this finding by
suggesting that it was a confused proceeding where incorrect orders were signed.
(Appellee's Brief at 26-27.) Appellee overlooks that the proceeding was confused only
because of her counsel's last minute recusal motion and that incorrect orders were signed
only because her counsel had submitted an erroneous order to the Court that did not conform
to the Court's orders, without having first sent the same to Appellant's counsel for review
despite counsel's prior request. Moreover, the proceedings were further confused with
Appellee's counsel appearing at Court on April 15,2004, despite her own motion to recuse,
and by her attempt to take unfair advantage of Appellant during the proceeding by orally
withdrawing her motion to recuse and then motioning the court for other orders.
The actions of Appellee both before she initiated this litigation and during the
pendency of this matter have been far from equitable, and have directly effected the course
of events in this matter to Appellant's detriment. As equity is reserved to those who have
acted equitably and denied to those who have not, Appellee is certainly not entitled to
11

equitable relief in the form of the permanent injunction issued by the lower court.
ISSUE NO. IV
Appellant did not Waive Her Right to the Disposition of Her
Husband's Remains as Appellant was Unaware of
His Cremation Instructions Prior to Burial.
Appellee forwards the argument that somehow it may be inferred from the
circumstances of this case that Appellant intentionally relinquished her right to determine the
disposition of her husband's remains. It has been specifically set forth by the Utah Supreme
Court that the intent to relinquish a right must be distinct. Soter's, Inc. v. Deseret Fed. Sav.
&Loan, 857 P.2d 935,940 (Utah 1993). Waiver should not be found from any particular set
of facts unless it was clearly intended. IcL A fact finder must determine based on the totality
of the circumstances whether the relinquishment is clearly intended. Id. at 941. Moreover,
the general principal in case law is that "[m]ere silence is not a waiver unless there is some
duty or obligation to speak." Id. at 940 (quoting Plateau Mining Co. v. Div. of State Lands
& Forestry, 802 P.2d 720,730 (Utah 1990)). Clearly Appellant did not manifest the requisite
intent indicating a waiver of her right to determine the ultimate disposition of her husband's
remains. Appellee suggests that because Appellant participated in the funeral services that
this implies a waiver. The newly assigned judge similarly concluded the burial of the
remains itself constituted a waiver on behalf of Appellant. Appellant's silence in relation to
the cremation, however, is directly tied to Appellee's active concealment of Mr. Hughes'
specific requests in relation thereto. Judge Shumate earlier made a determination after
hearing the testimony of both Appellant and Appellee that Appellant did not learn of her
12

husband's instructions to cremate his remains until after the burial had taken place. (R397).
Appellant, in actuality, did not learn of the cremation request until late in the summer of
2002. (T1200 at 62:18-23; 67:14-24). Were it not for the fact that Mr. Hughes' cremation
request had been withheld from her, Appellant would have had the remains of her husband
cremated before the burial services took place. (T1200 at 114:3-15).
The issue of waiver is a fact intensive issue and summary judgement on waiver should
be reserved for circumstances where there are clearly no disputed issues of material fact.
IHC Health Servs. Inc. v. D & K Mgmt. Inc.73 P.3d 320, 323 (Utah 2003). On the
Appellate level, as on the trial level, this Court should view facts in a light most favorable
to a party losing on summary judgment and give no deference to the lower court's
conclusions of law. Bearden v. Croft. 31 P.3d 537, 538 (Utah 2001). Specifically, it has
been held that "[i]n a waiver case determined on summary judgment, we must first inquire
whether there are disputed material facts. If there are no disputed material facts, we consider
all the undisputed material facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." IHC
Health Servs. Inc., 73 P.3d at 323. As this Court must consider the facts in the light most
favorable to Appellant, any factual scenario represented by Appellee that is out ofjoint with
Appellant's factual statements and findings of the lower court, must be rejected. The facts
of the case demonstrate that Appellee knew of Mr. Hughes' desire to be cremated and
blatantly withheld such information from Appellant. Certainly it is not possible to determine
that Appellant was aware of a right to cremate her husband and intentionally waived that
right considering such vital information was hidden from her by Appellee.
13

Appellee argues that In re Estate of Mover. 577 P.2d 108 (Utah 1978) and Paskeret
al. v. Morse. 887 P.2d 872 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) support an inference that Appellee waived
the right to chose cremation. However, both of these cases are factually distinguishable to
the present matter in important respects and therefore do not apply. First, in Mover, the
decedent's wishes for cremation were communicated by will to the executor who had the
"right and a duty" to carry out the will. Id at 110. The execulor failed to act and permitted
the mother and family of the decedent to carry out the burial. Id. The obvious and crucial
difference between Mover and the case at hand is that in Mover the person with the foremost
right to determine the disposition of the decedent did not ad on that right. In the present
matter, to the contrary the person with the foremost right to determine the disposition of the
decedent, after the decedent himself, i.e. the Appellant, was denied knowledge regarding the
decedent's instructions. Absent such knowledge regarding the wishes of her husband,
Appellant was not in a position to exercise that right and carry out his directives. The body
in Mover was buried without objection even though the party entitled to make the objection
was fully aware of the decedent's wishes. Such was not the case in the matter at hand where
Appellant was wholly unaware of her husband's wishes to be cremated.
In Pasker, the Defendant Morse had entered into a contract with Holland-Pasker &
Associates concerning the design and construction of an office building. Pasker et al. v.
Morse, 887 P.2d 872, 873-74 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). The project had four distinct phases.
IcL After completion of the first phase, the schematic design phase, the contract dictated that
Holland-Pasker would not proceed to the following phase unless payment for the first phase
14

was received. Id. at 874. Regardless of this contractual agreement, upon completion of the
schematic design phase Morse, who had been working side by side with Holland-Pasker and
visited the latter's office an average of three times per week, requested that Holland-Pasker
"proceed immediately to the design development phase" of the contract although no payment
on the first phase had been made. Id at 876. Pasker-Holland accordingly proceeded to the
second phase of the project. Id. At trial Pasker-Holland claimed, and successfully argued
to the trial court, that Morse was liable for the work performed on both phases of the project.
Id. Morse asserted a defense that the contract restricted Pasker-Holland from proceeding to
the second phase without having received compensation for the first phase. Id. at 876-77.
In deciding in favor of Pasker-Holland on appeal, the Court stated that "[b]y asking Pasker
to proceed with the design development phase, knowing full well he had not yet paid for the
schematic phase work, Morse intentionally waived any benefit he had under the provision."
Id. at 877. Morse clearly knew what his rights were under the contract yet, nonetheless,
verbally informed Pasker-Holland to proceed to the next phase anyhow.
Clearly the case at hand is distinguishable where Appellant made no representation
and expressed no intent whatsoever regarding the waiver of her rights with respect to
disposition of Mr. Hughes' remains. The Court's inference of waiver in Pasker was clearly
supported where the Defendant himself had verbally waived his contractual protections. No
such indication of waiver on the part of Appellant exists in this case and the facts, especially
when construed in favor of Appellant, in no way support such an attenuated inference.
Appellee's analogies to Mover and Pasker and argument that the same support a finding of
15

waiver in this case should be rejected as mere attempts to misdirect the Court and confuse
the issues. Under the law regarding waiver as established in Utah, it is simply not possible
to make any factual inference that Appellant waived the right to determine the final
disposition of her husband's remains.
CONCLUSION
Appellant seeks to exercise her right to disinter her deceased husband and finally
dispose of his remains as he instructed. This matter would never have resulted in litigation
had Appellee been forthright with Appellant from the start. Appellee, choosing to follow her
own initiative and clearly rejecting the Plaintiff instructions of her son to be cremated, opted
to engage in deceit and foul play in order to keep secret the decedent's final requests
regarding the disposition of his remains. Appellee actively hid the truth from Appellant in
order to carry out the burial. Had Appellant been informed of the contents of her husband's
note and his final directions, Appellant, who was willing to honor such directions, would
have carried them out as requested.
Appellee submits to this Court a set of facts substantially inapposite to the evidence
of the case and statement of facts set forth by Appellant. Notwithstanding Appellee's
representation of the facts the Court is constrained on reviewing the trial court's summary
judgment ruling to construe the facts in the light most favorable to Appellant.
Appellant, as the decedent's spouse, has the foremost to determine the disposition of
her husband's remains. This right continues, even though the remains have been wrongly
interred contrary to his wishes. Appellant did not waive this right as her silence until after
16

the burial did not manifest a consent to a burial, but rather an ignorance of Mr. Hughes'
directions. Appellant is entitled to carry out her late husband's wishes and should not be
barred from so doing from the wrongfully issued injunction, which should be reversed by this
Court. In addition, Appellant should be awarded her reasonable attorney's fees for defending
against the wrongful injunction.
DATED this

/ S d a y of November, 2004.
HUGHES AND BURSELL

MICHAEL D. HUGHES
Attorney for Respondent/Appellant

I, Michael D. Hughes, certify that on November
_, 2004,1 served two copies of the
attached Reply Brief of Appellant upon Kathleen McConkie, the counsel for the Appellee in this
matter, by mailing the same, via first class mail, postage prepaid, at the following address:
Kathleen McConkie
150 North Main Street
Suite 202
Bountiful, Utah 84010

Michael D. Hughes
Attorney of Record
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

DEANNAPUGH
Petitioner,
v.
LESLIE DOZZO-OTERO [SIC] DOZZOHUGHES, MARTY GILCREASE
STROMAN, CITY OF ST GEORGE,
TERRY SCHRAMM, St George Cemetery
Sexton, and SOUTHWEST UTAH PUBLIC
HEALTH DEPARTMENT,

MEMORANDUM IN
OPPOSITION TO PETITIONER'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND REPLY TO
PETITIONER'S MEMORANDUM
IN OPPOSITION TO
RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Respondents.
Case No 020502154
Judge G. Rand Beacham

COMES NOW, Leslie Dozzo-Hughes, by and through her attorneys of record Michael D
Hughes and William O Kimball, of Hughes and Bursell, P C , hereby file this Memorandum in
Opposition to Petitioner's Motion for Summary Judgment and Reply to Petitioner's Memorandum
m Opposition to Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment

MEMORANDUM
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Respondent disputes paragraph #3 of Petitioner's Statement of Facts because

Petitioner is stating a partial truth. Curtis did leave a voice mail message on February 12,2002, but
then called back !4 hour later and stated that he did not mean what he said. Furthermore, the
Respondent thought that it was a ploy to get attention, as is common in her profession. (Deposition
ofLeslieDozzo-Hughesp.143, lines 8-15).
2.

Respondent disputes #5 ofPetitioner's Statement ofFacts because although she made

the arrangements, Petitioner's family constantly pushed the Respondent and Cory Hughes was
waiting at French's Mortuary and tried to intimidate the Respondent into releasing Curtis' s body for
burial in Utah. Furthermore, Respondent did not release possession and control of the body to
Petitioner. Petitioner allowed Metcalf Mortuary to take the body to Utah, but she did not release the
body to Petitioner in any manner, contrary to Petitioner's baseless assertions. (Affidavit of Leslie
Dozzo-Hughes paragraph 2).
3.

Respondent disputes paragraph #7 of Petitioner's Statement of Facts because

Petitioner was very nervous that the Respondent would want to cremate Curtis. This fear was
stimulated by the Petitioner's knowledge of the contents of the note. (See hearing transcript for
December 16-17).
4.

Respondent disputes paragraph #8 of Petitioner's Statement of Facts because

Petitioner only showed the Respondent part of the note. Respondent was not allowed to see the
of 2002. and thus, did not know the wishes of her deceased

husband until after the burial. (Affidavit of Leslie Dozzo-Hughes paragraph 4; Judge Shumate's
May 19, 2003 Ruling).
5.

Respondent disputes paragraph #9 of Petitioner's Statement of Facts regarding the

connotation that Respondent waived her rights to the body of her deceased husband. Respondent
allowed Metcalf Mortuary to take her husband to Utah and bury him. Petitioner may have paid the
mortuary, but the Respondent never relinquished control of her husband to Petitioner. (Affidavit of
Leslie Dozzo-Hughes paragraph 5).
6.

Respondent refutes paragraph#l 0 ofPetitioner's Statement ofFacts. Respondent did

not affirm the burial by attending the funeral service. Respondent was not aware of Curtis' wish to
be cremated at this point and in no way affirmed the burial, particularly absent the knowledge of her
deceased husband's directive. (Affidavit of Leslie Dozzo-Hughes paragraph 6; Judge Shumate's
May 19, 2003 Ruling).
7.

Respondent refutes paragraph #11 of Petitioner's Statement ofFacts as not applicable

to the present case. The stone and bench placed upon the grave was not placed on the grave until
after the December 16 and 17 hearing.

Furthermore, to hurt the Respondent, Petitioner

conspicuously left Respondent's name off the memorial portion of the bench. (Affidavit of Leslie
Dozzo-Hughes paragraph 7).
8.

Respondent refutes paragraph #12 of Petitioner's Statement of Facts as far as no

actual proof exists relating to this paragraph. Petitioner stated at her deposition that she did not own
the land that Curtis was buried on. (Deanna Pugh Deposition p. 30, lines 2-9).

unsubstantiated by the Affidavit of Deanna Pugh. Deanna Pugh cannot testify regarding the
knowledge of the other family members. Furthermore, had Curtis' family not lied to the Respondent,
she would not need to pursue the present action to honor her deceased husband's wishes.
10.

Respondent refutes paragraph#14 of Petitioner's Statement of Facts by referring this

Court to Judge Shumate's Ruling dated May 19, 2003, which states "[s]ometime following the
burial, Respondent became aware of Mr. Hughes' desire to be cremated and have his ashes scattered
from abridge spanning the Rio Grande River." Judge Shumate's May 19, 2003 Ruling.
ARGUMENT
I.

UTAH LAW ENABLES THE RESPONDENT TO HONOR HER DECEASED
HUSBAND'S BURIAL WISH

Petitioner weakly argues that the language of U.C.A. § 58-9-602 "does not provide for
'disinterment,' but merely for disposition for a deceased person upon death which includes the
location and condition of the disposition." Again, the plain meaning of the statute cannot be any
clearer. Utah Code Annotated § 58-9-602 provides the following:
The right and duty to control the disposition of a deceased person,
including the location and conditions of the disposition, vest in the
following degrees of relationship in the order named:
(1) a person designated in a written
instrument, excluding a power of attorney that
terminates at death under Sections 75-5-501
and 75-5-502 . . .
(2) the surviving, legally recognized spouse of
the decedent
4.-u^ on-r^nno- ph-Ufi o r tk e majority of the

surviving children of the decedent over the
age of 18;
(4) the unanimous consent of the surviving
parent, parents, or lawful custodian of the
decedent.

The plain meaning of the applicable part of the Utah statute is that the surviving spouse has "[t]he
right and duty to control disposition, including the location and conditions of the disposition." The
statute sets out that the surviving spouse has control over not only the burial arrangements, but also
"the location and conditions of the disposition." The statute does not say that Respondent waives
her right to the disposition (of the body once it is placed in the ground. The statute clearly gives
plenary power to the Respondent, Leslie Dozzo, who is Curtis Hughes' legal spouse. Utah case law
has extensively determined that "[w]hen interpreting statutes, our primary goal is to evince 'the true
intent and purpose of the Legislature.'" Utah v. Tooele County, 44 P.3d 680 (citing Jensen v.
Intermountain Health Care. Inc., 679 P.2d 903, 906 (Utah 1984)). The plain language of the statute
provides us with the road map to the statute's meaning, helping to clarify the intent and purpose
behind its enactment. Id. (citations omitted). When reading the statutory language, our purpose is
'to render all parts [of the statute] relevant and meaningful," id. (emphasis added)(a"fr'ng Millett v.
Clark County Corp., 609 P.2d 934, 936 (Utah 1980)), and thus, we 'presume the legislature use[d]
each term advisedly and . . . according to its ordinary meaning." Id. (citing Nelson v. Salt Lake
County, 905 P.2d 872, 875 (Utah 1995)). As a result, we 'avoid interpretations that will render a
statute superfluous or inoperative." Id. (citing Hall v. Utah State Dep't of Corr., 24 P.3d 958 (Utah
OAA1 \
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husband, it would render the statute "inoperative" as to all activities subsequent to burial. Again,
the statute gives the power to control "the location and conditions of the disposition," not only the
initial burial process.
n

-

THE SMART V. MOYER CASE DOES NOT BAR DISINTERMENT

Petitioner continues to misdirect this Court to the case of Smart v. Mover. 577 P.2d 108
(Utah 1978). The Smart case is distinguishable from the present facts. First, in the Smart case, the
executor of the will at the time ofburial was aware of the decedent's contrary directives for disposal.
In fact, the executor had the will in his possession and failed to timely object to the burial of the
decedent. Second, the executor of the will was not legally related to the decedent and only had
authority through the will. Conversely, in this case, the Respondent was not made aware of her
spouse's written directives until "[sjometime following the burial, Respondent became aware ofMr.
Hughes' desire to be cremated and have his ashes scattered from a bridge spanning the Rio Grande
River." Judge Shumate made this factual finding after receiving testimony from both parties over
a two day period on December 16th and 17th 2002. Thus, Petitioner did not waive any right to honor
the wishes of her deceased spouse unknown to her in March 2002. In addition, as she is the legal
spouse of the decedent, pursuant to common law, she has sole discretion when it comes to the
disposition of her husband's remains and disposition thereafter. Hackett v. Hackett, 26 A. 42 (RJ.
1893V,Pettigrewv.Pettigrew, 56 A. 878 (Pa. 1904V, Southern Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Morgan, 105
So. 161 (Ala. App. Ct. 1925); Teaslev v. Thompson, 165 S.W.2d 940 (Ark. 1942); Leschev v.
Leschey, 97 A.2d 784 (Pa. 1953); Tkaczvk v. Gallagher, 222 A.2d 226 (Sup. Ct. of Conn., New

m.

U.C.A. § 58-9-601 ET. SEQ. SHOULD APPLY TO THE PRESENT CASE
BECAUSE UTAH HAS NO OTHER APPLICABLE UTAH LAW.

Ultimately, new legislation codified as U.C.A. § 58-9-602 should apply to the present case.
There was no applicable law in Utah prior to U.C.A. § 58-9-602 to assist the Court in a
determination in this case. Petitioner is asserting the U.C.A. § 58-9-602 should only apply
prospectively and not retroactively. That is normally true where a new statute replaces old law.
However, in this case, there is no old law. The Smart case simply does not apply and there is no
other case law in Utah to assist this Court.
TV.

IF THIS COURT DETERMINES THAT U.C.A. 58-9-601 ET. SEQ. DOES
NOT APPLY TO THE PRESENT CASE, WE MUST TURN TO NEW
MEXICO LAW THAT MIRRORS U.C.A. 58-9-601 ET. SEQ.

In this case, New Mexico law should apply because both the decedent and Petitioner were
domiciled in the New Mexico, the decedent died in New Mexico, the parties were married in New
Mexico and the decedent was only shipped to Utah post mortem for burial. As this action has been
initiated in the State of Utah, Utah choice of law rules clearly apply to determine whether New
Mexico or Utah law should govern the present case. Utah Courts have long determined that "[S]ince
Utah is the forum state, Utah's choice of law rules determine the outcome of the conflict." Shaw v.
Lavton Constr. Co.. Inc., 872P.2d 1059, 1063 (UtahCt. App. 1994) (citing Klaxon Co. v. Stentor
Elec. Mfg. Co.. 313 U.S. 487, 495-96, 85 L Ed. 1477, 61 S.Ct. 1020 (1941)).
Utah has adopted the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws. Justice Wilkins, speaking
for a unanimous Supreme Court inWaddoupsv Amalgamated Sugar Co., 54 P.3d 1054,1059 (Utah

2002) stated that in order to ascertain which state's law is applicable in a given case, "[i]n Utah we
apply the 'most significant relationship" approach as described in the Restatement (Second) of
Conflict of Laws in determining which state5 s laws should apply to a given circumstance. See Am.
Nat'l Fire Ins. Co. v. Fanners Ins. Exch., 927 P.2d 186,190 (Utah 1996); see also Records v. Briegs.
887 P.2d 864, 867-68 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (explaining that this court has adopted the 'most
significant relationship' test over the previously used lex loci approach for torts and likely intended
to apply the approach to other types of claims, and identifying federal cases that concluded we
'would apply the 'most significant relationship' test in contract as well a tort matter"); cited in
Waddoups v. Amalgamated Suear Co., 54P.3d 1054,1059 (Utah 2002). In Waddoups, the case was
determined to fall under the realm of a tort action and thus the applicable factors were considered
to determine whether Utah or Idaho law applied. After determining that the actions took place in
Idaho and most of the contact of the parties was in Idaho, the Supreme Court determined that "Idaho
has the most significant relationship with the parties and their employment relationship, and we
therefore apply the substantive law of Idaho." Waddoups at 1160.
In order to ascertain what constitutes the "most significant relationship" we turn to the
Restatement Second of Conflict of Laws § 6. Section 6 specifically provides that:
§ 6 Choice-Of-Law Principles
(1)

(2)
(a)
(b)
(c)

A court, subject to constitutional restrictions, will
follow statutory directive of its own state on choice of
law.
When there is no such directive, the factors relevant
to the choice of the applicable rule of law incude
the needs of the interstate and international systems, *
the relevant policies of the forum,
the relevant policies of other interested states and the

(d)
(e)
(f)
(g)

relative interests of those states in the determination
of the particular issue,
the protection of justified expectations,
the basic policies underlying the particular field of
law,
certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and
ease in the determination and application of the law to
be applied.

In contract disputes, in order to ascertain the above elements, the Court normally looks to the place
of contracting, the place of the negotiating of the contract, the place of performance, the location of
the subj ect matter and the domicile of the parties. Morris v. Health Net of California, Inc., 988 P.2d
940, 942 (Utah 1999). The facts of this particular case are not exactly a contract dispute, but it is
helpful to consider similar factors. In this case, Curtis resided in New Mexico. Furthermore, Curtis
passed away in New Mexico. Furthermore, Curtis and the Respondent were married in New Mexico.
In addition, a New Mexico mortuary service prepared Curtis for burial and a service was held in New
Mexico. Moreover, the Respondent is a resident of New Mexico and has exercised her rights as a
resident of New Mexico since Curtis' passing. Therefore, it would stand to reason that New Mexico
law would govern this particular case, if Utah and New Mexico law do not coincide.
Petitioner will likely argue that Utah law should apply because Curtis was ultimately buried
in Utah. However, Respondent, under the New Mexico statute was simply exercising her ability to
determine where Curtis would be buried. The Respondent did not waive her right under the New
Mexico statute once Curtis was buried in Utah. The Respondent5 s ability to govern the whereabouts
of her deceased husband continues under the New Mexico Statute to this day. Thus, if necessary,
the New Mexico statute should be applied in the present case to ur>ho1ri "Reqnnnrlpnt'c rinrVi+c

regarding he deceased husband
hi this case, there is no conflict between Utah law and New Mexico law. Under both statutes,
the Respondent maintains control of her deceased husband and determines where and how he should
rest. Petitioner has unduly tried to usurp this power. The Utah Supreme Court has determined that
where no significant differences exist between Utah law and law of other states, "the court may
properly apply Utah law in the absence of an affirmative showing that the law of [the other state] is
different" cited in Jeff v. Stubbs, 970P.2d 1234, 1251 (Utah 1998). New Mexico law provides in
relevant part the following:
If a decedent has left no written instructions regarding the
disposition of his remains [i.e. a document that conforms with the
requirements of a will], the following persons in the order listed
shall determine the means of disposition, not to be limited to
cremation, of the remains of the decedent:
(a) the surviving spouse;
(b) a majority of the surviving parents of the decedent;
©) the surviving parents of the decedent;
(d) a majority of the surviving siblings of the decedent.
New Mexico Statutes Annotated § 24-12A-2
As the above statute provides, the Respondent has control over the "means of disposition."
V.

THE RESPONDENT HAS NOT DECLINED TO ACT ON HER RIGHT AND
DUTY TO CONTROL THE DISPOSITION OF HER HUSBAND

In addition, Petitioner argues that because she paid for the mortuary service in Utah that
Respondent somehow waived her rights to determine the disposition and continuing disposition of

her husband. In support of her position, Petitioner cites U.C.A. § 58-9-603. In part this section
states that *'[i]f a person declines to act on the right and duty to control the disposition as established
in this part, the right and duty to control the disposition pass . . . ." In no way did Respondent
decline to act on her right and duty. Exercising her power under the New Mexico Statute, the
Respondent allowed her husband to be buried in Utah. She did not voluntarily relinquish control of
the disposition of her husband, she simply allowed him to buried in Utah. Simply crossing state lines
and allowing the Petitioner to assist with funeral costs does not constitute a waiver.
Furthermore, Respondent's actions do not constitute a waiver. Waiver is defined as "[t]he
voluntary relinquishment or abandonment... of a legal right or advantage . . . . " BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1574 (7th 1999). Respondent has never stated or indicated in any way that she has
committed a waiver in the present case. Moreover, Respondent's actions do not constitute a waiver.
Allowing Petitioner to assist in paying for the burial and transportation does not mean Respondent
has waived her rights to her husband's body. Respondent has not relinquished or abandoned her
legal right to designate where he husband's body resides.
CONCLUSION
Under U.C.A. § 58-9-602 the Respondent has complete control over the her husbands
remains. In addition, the Smart v. Mover case is not applicable to the present facts and need not be
examined by this Court. Moreover, U.C.A. § 58-9-602 is the only applicable law in Utah and does
not overtake any other Utah law that would govern the present case. If this Court determines that
U.CA. § 58-9-601 et. seq. should not apply to the present case, New Mexico Statutes Annotated §
24-12A-2 must apply to the present case. Clearly New Mexico has the "most significant contacts"

in the case at bar.
Therefore, Petitioner' s preliminary injunction should be dismissed. Respondent also reserves
the issue regarding attorneys fees for a later date.
DATED this

¥4
r

day of August, 2003.
HUGHES AND BURSELL

WILLIAM 0. KIMBALL
Attorneys for Respondent

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a full, true and correct copy of the above and foregoing
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND REPLY TO PETITIONER'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO
RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT was placed in the United States
mail at St. George, Utah, with first-class postage thereon fully prepaid, on the <-j&\ day of August,
2003, addressed as follows:
Jeffrey C. Peatross
Ranney and Peatross
1722 East 280 North, #C-2
St. Georee. UT 84770

Terry Schramm
Sexton of the St. George City Cemetery
700 East Tabernacle
St. George, UT 84770

Eric Ludlow
Washington County Attorney
192 East 200 North
Suite 200
St. George, UT 84770
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

DEANNA PUGH
AFFIDAVIT OF LESLIE DOZZOHUGHES

Petitioner,
v.
LESLIE DOZZO-OTERO, [SIC] DOZZOHUGHES MARTY GDLCREASE
STROMAN, CITY OF ST. GEORGE,
TERRY SCHRAMM, St. George Cemetery
Sexton, and SOUTHWEST UTAH PUBLIC
HEALTH DEPARTMENT,

Case No. 020502154
Judge: James L. Schumate

Respondents.

STATE OF NEW MEXICO
,
COUNTY OF ~ ^ B e y - A ^ iUb

)
:ss
)

L Leslie Dozzo-Hughes, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says as follows:

03 03:14p

L. Dozzo

Ay§> I 20UJ \ l 57PM

Ph.D

5C5-323-9430

HUGHES & BURSELL

No h

1.

I am over the age of twenty-one.

2.

Petitioner and her family were try ing to force me to have Curtis buried in St. George,

Utah. In fact, Cory Hughes was waiting at Frenches mortuary to try and persuade me regarding
Curtis burial.
3.

I at no time released possession and control of Curtis to the Petitioner. I allowed the

Mortuary service from St George, Utah to take Curtis, but I did not release control of Curtis to the
Petitioner. In fact, I determined, without knowing the wishes of Cuitis, that he should be buried in
S t George, Utah.
4.

Initially, I was only shown the first sentence of the note and a sentence or two near

the end. Petitioner, then ripped the note out of my hands. I was not allowed to see the entire note
until sometime in the Summer of 2002, and thus, I did not know the wishes of my deceased husband
until that time.
5.

At no time did I waive my rightto determine the disposition of my deceased husband.

I allowed Metcalf Mortuary to take Curtis to Utah and bury him, but I authorized all the actions that
took place and never relinquished control over my deceased husband.
6.

I do not agree that by attending Curtis' burial in Utah that I was affirming anything.

At the time of my attendance, I was not aware of Curtis' wish to be cremated.
7.

ThcPetitionerputabench on Curtis' grave sometime after the December 16-17,2002

hearing. I was very upset after I saw the bench and realized that she put everyone's name on the
bench except mine, I believe this was done to intentionally hurt me and somehow attempt to deny

rtus-

I . ZUU3 12:57PW

HUGHES & BL'RSELL

No-U69

P- o

my love for Curtis.
8.

Had the Petitioner and Curtis' family not lied to me, I would have been able to

promptly honor Curtis' burial wishes.
FURTHER AFFIANT SAITH NAUGHT.
DATED this

/

day of August, 2003.

STATE OF / \ | A £ ) ) l f c ^ / C c )

)

COUNTY QF~&fAftl»Clft

)

__ day of August 2003, personally appeared before me Leslie Dozzo-Hughes
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a full, true, and correct copy of the above and foregoing Affidavit of
Leslie Dozzo-Hughes was placed in the United States mail, at St George, Utah, with first-class
postage thereon fully prepaid, on the ^[ day August, 2003 > addressed as follows:
Jeffrey C. Peatross
Ranney and Peatross
1722 East 280 North, #C-2
St. George, UT 84770
Terry Schramm
Sexton of the St. George City Cemetery
700 East Tabernacle
St. George, UT 84770
Eric Ludlow
Washington County Attorney
192 East 200 North
Suite 200
St. George, UT 84770
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MICHAEL D. HUGHES (1572)
WILLIAM 0. KIMBALL (9460)
HUGHES & BURSELL, P.C.
Attorneys for Respondent
187 North 100 West
St. George, Utah 84770
Telephone: (435) 673-4892
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

DEANNAPUGH
Petitioner,
v.

RESPONDENT'S REPLY TO
PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
STATEMENT OF FACTS

LESLIE DOZZO-OTERO, [SIC] DOZZOHUGHES MARTY GILCREASE
STROMAN, CITY OF ST. GEORGE,
TERRY SCHRAMM, St. George Cemetary
Sexton, and SOUTHWEST UTAH PUBLIC
HEALTH DEPARTMENT,
Respondents.

Case No. 020502154
Judge: G. Rand Beacham

COMES NOW, Leslie Dozzo-Hughes, by and through her attorneys of record Michael D.
Hughes and William O. Kimball, of Hughes and Bursell, P.C, hereby file Respondent's Reply to
Petitioner's Motion for Summary Judgment Statement of Facts.
1.

On February 12, 2002, Respondent received a voice mail messagefrom Curtis stating

that he was going to kill himself and that he would like to he cremated and have his ashes spread
over the Rio Grande. (Dozzo-Hughes Deposition p. 142, lines 6-13).
Respondent disputes paragraph #3 of Petitioner's Statement of Facts because Petitioner is
stating a partial truth. Curtis did leave a voice mail message on February 12, 2002, but then called
back Vi hour later and stated that he did not mean what he said. Furthermore, the Respondent
thought that it was a ploy to get attention, as is common in her profession. (Deposition of Leslie
Dozzo-Hughes p.143, lines 8-15).
2.

Respondent made the preparations for the service in Albuquerque and made the

decision completely on her own, without the assistance of any of Curtis'sfamily members, to release
possession and control of Curtis's body to Petitioner by authorizing his body to be shipped to Utah
for additionalfuneral services and burial in Utah. (Dozzo-Hughes Deposition p. 140, lines 23-25
and p. 141, lines 1-7 and Affidavit ofDeanna Pugh).
Respondent disputes #5 of Petitioner's Statement of Facts because although she made the
arrangements, Petitioner's family constantly pushed the Respondent and Cory Hughes was waiting
at French's Mortuary and tried to intimidate the Respondent into releasing Curtis's body for burial
in Utah. Furthermore, Respondent did not release possession and control of the body to Petitioner.
Petitioner allowed Metcalf Mortuary to take the body to Utah, but she did not release the body to
Petitioner in any manner, contrary to Petitioner's baseless assertions. (Affidavit of Leslie DozzoHughes paragraph 2).

2

3.

Petitioner read for the first time the note left to her by her son on March 6, 2002.

(Deanna Pugh Deposition p. 22, lines 5-21).
Respondent disputes paragraph #7 of Petitioner's Statement of Facts because Petitioner was
very nervous that the Respondent would want to cremate Curtis. This fear was stimulated by the
Petitioner's knowledge of the contents of the note. (See hearing transcript for December 16-17).
4.

Petitioner showed Respondent the note Curtis left Petitioner, immediately after

reading it for the first time, on March 6, 2003. (Dozzo-Hughes Deposition p. 121, 1-10).
Respondent disputes paragraph #8 of Petitioner's Statement of Facts because Petitioner only
showed the Respondent part of the note. Respondent was not allowed to see the entire note until
sometime in the Summer of 2002, and thus, did not know the wishes of her deceased husband until
after the burial. (Affidavit of Leslie Dozzo-Hughes paragraph 4; Judge Shumate's May 19, 2003
Ruling).
5.

Petitioner hired MetcalfMortuary to obtain possession and control of Curtis's body

from Albuquerque for a funeral service and interment in the burial plot in St. George, Utah.
Petitioner paid for all expenses incurredfor the shipment of Curtis's body, funeral and burial in St.
George, Utah. (Affidavit of Deanna Pugh).
Respondent disputes paragraph #9 of Petitioner's Statement of Facts regarding the
connotation that Respondent waived her rights to the body of her deceased husband. Respondent
allowed Metcalf Mortuary to take her husband to Utah and bury him. Petitioner may have paid the
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mortuary, but the Respondent never relinquished control of her husband to Petitioner. (Affidavit of
Leslie Dozzo-Hughes paragraph 5).
6.

On March 8, 2002, Respondent affirmed the burial by attending the funeral service,

the burial in Washington County, Utah
Respondent refutes paragraph #10 of Petitioner's Statement of Facts. Respondent did not
affirm the burial by attending the funeral service. Respondent was not aware of Curtis' wish to be
cremated at this point and in no way affirmed the burial, particularly absent the knowledge of her
deceased husband's directive. (Affidavit of Leslie Dozzo-Hughes paragraph 6; Judge Shumate's
May 19, 2003 Ruling).
7.

Petitioner purchased the stone and bench placed upon the grave of her son.

(Affidavit ofDeanna Pugh).
Respondent refutes paragraph #11 of Petitioner's Statement of Facts as not applicable to the
present case. The stone and bench placed upon the grave was not placed on the grave until after the
December 16 and 17 hearing. Furthermore, to hurt the Respondent, Petitioner conspicuously left
Respondent's name off the memorial portion of the bench. (Affidavit of Leslie Dozzo-Hughes
paragraph 7).
8.

Petitioner has burial rights to three plots next to her son for her burial and Her

husband's burial (Deanna Pugh Deposition p. 29, lines 19-24).
Respondent refutes paragraph #12 of Petitioner's Statement ofFacts as far as no actual proof
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exists relating to this paragraph. Petitioner stated at her deposition that she did not own the land that
Curtis was buried on. (Deanna Pugh Deposition p. 30, lines 2-9).
9.

Respondent at no time from the death of Curtis to the burial ten days later indicated

to Petitioner or any members of Petitioner's family that her decision to allow Petitioner to bury
Curtis in St. George, Utah, was in any way temporary. (Affidavit Deanna Pugh.).
Respondent refutes paragraph #13 of Petitioner's Statement of Facts as unsubstantiated by
the Affidavit of Deanna Pugh. Deanna Pugh cannot testify regarding the knowledge of the other
family members. Furthermore, had Curtis' family not lied to the Respondent, she would not need
to pursue the present action to honor her deceased husband's wishes.
10.

Petitioner specifically disputes Respondent's paragraph #4 in her statement of facts.

Respondent clearly knew of Decedent's alleged wish to be cremated before his death. See # 3 above.
Respondent refutes paragraph #14 of Petitioner's Statement of Facts by referring this Court
to Judge Shumate's Ruling dated May 19, 2003, which states "[s]ometime following the burial,
Respondent became aware of Mr. Hughes' desire to be cremated and have his ashes scattered from
a bridge spanning the Rio Grande River." (Judge Shumate's May 19, 2003 Ruling).
DATED this IV

day of September, 2003.
HUGHES & BURSELL

WILLIAM O. KIMBALL
MICHAEL D.HUGHES
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a fall, true and correct copy of the above and foregoing
RESPONDENT'S REPLY TO PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
STATEMENT OF FACTS was placed in th&United States mail at St. George, Utah, with firstclass postage thereon fully prepaid, on the ^Z^aay of September, 2003, addressed as follows:
Jeffrey C. Peatross
Ranney and Peatross
1722 East 280 North, #C-2
St. George, UT 84770

Terry Schramm
Sexton of the St. George City Cemetery
700 East Tabernacle
St. George, UT 84770

Eric Ludlow
Washington County Attorney
192 East 200 North
Suite 200
St. George, UT 84770
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